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CHAPTER 8
Consciousness and Society:
In Defence of a Phenomenological 
Approach to Social Reality
KOSHY THARAKAN
With the advent o f Postmodernism, the recent discussions 
in C on tin en ta l th ou gh t has ca lled  into q uestion  the  
philosophy o f the Subject, particularly the Cartesian “cogito” 
and the related method of reflection. As a matter o f fact, 
the questioning o f the reflective subject began with the 
Existentialists. One need only to recall how Kierkegaard 
inverts th e C artesian d ictum  “co g ito  ergo su m ” to 
demonstrate the primacy o f existence over consciousness. 
One o f the important ramifications o f these questioning of 
the reflective subject is to do with the phenom enological 
doctrine o f intentionality o f consciousness. Recently, David 
Carr, him self a phenom enologist, has advanced a serious 
objection to the phenomenological approach to social reality. 
In what fo llow s, I will be a ttem p tin g  a d e fe n c e  o f  
phenom enology against criticisms like Carr’s.
According to Carr, phenomenology is incapable o f forging 
an adequate understanding o f the social as the cornerstone 
o f phenom enological philosophy, namely the doctrine o f  
in ten tio n a lity  o f  co n sciou sn ess, is a resp on se  to the 
problem atic relation  betw een hum an exp erien ce  and  
nature. Hence, employing it in the sphere o f social relations 
is a case o f misapplication o f the principle.1 According to 
Carr the notion o f  intentionality is purported to substitute 
for the notion o f causality. The causal investigation resulted
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in naturalizing the human subject, reducing ‘Man’ to the 
status o f  an effect o f  the vast causal order. He points out 
that such causal understanding o f the intentional object o f  
a thought resulted in the Cartesian problem o f proving the 
existence and nature o f the external world. Further, it is 
susceptible to the Humean scepticism as the causal relation 
is an external relation and thus is contingent. Thus, any 
attempt to draw inferences from our ideas to their origin in 
causal terms, to a world that causes the ideas is open to all 
sceptical doubts. However, Hum e’s sceptical solution to the 
sceptical problem exhorts us to proceed with the causal 
investigations o f the world irrespective o f the fact that we 
are not sure o f the universality and necessity o f  the causal 
orders. Now, Carr points out that this further complicates 
the problem: “... given the assumption o f the universality o f  
the causal order, all being m ust belong to that order, 
including mental being. The contents o f  the mind must be 
considered entities or events which are related to the rest 
o f nature according to causal principles.”2It is a short step 
from here to reduce the mental into the physical. Thus, the 
principle o f causality converts the human sciences into a 
naturalistic inquiry.
* Carr rightly characterizes Husserl’s intentionality thesis as 
a response to this situation. It removes the sceptical, as well 
as the solipsistic problem, by showing that human experience 
refers to something beyond itself as consciousness is always 
consciousness o f something. That is to say that intentional 
relation being a direct relation, we can assure ourselves that 
our knowledge is really about the object and not merely 
about the contents o f  our m ind. As Carr shows, m ore 
importantly, the doctrine of intentionality liberates us at once 
from the very natural order with which it puts us in direct 
contact because o f its peculiar relation o f “consciousness o r —  
an important feature o f consciousness which has no place in 
the natural physical world.
Thus Carr maintains that intentionality is professed as a 
solution to the problem we have with the natural world. He
Consciousness and Society 131
says that “...intentional approach is essentially designed to 
deal with our relation to nature”3 and as such it cannot be 
gainfully used when we have to describe the problem of  
intersubjectivity, the kernel o f social reality. This is so because 
the approach o f intentionality is a reflective procedure in 
w hich o n e  exam ines o n e ’s own exp erien ce. Thus, by 
reflecting on my experience and my world, I constitute the 
meaning o f an alter ego. This way, “the other” is treated as a 
phenom enon, a cogitatum. Carr’s contention is that this 
approach cannot do justice to “...the pervasiveness and 
priority o f our social being and the apriori character o f our 
relation to others.”4 An important consequence of reflective 
analysis is that the other person is treated as a phenomenon  
from the point o f view of the phenomenologist and not in 
the image “the other” has o f himself/herself. Ii is from the 
perspective o f the reflecting ego that one grasps “the other”, 
the other as an object o f knowledge.
Here we may recall that Husserl’s objective was to examine 
the origin o f the “concept” o f alter ego, and not to prove 
the existence of others. As Carr himself points out, Schutz 
has understood Husserl in this way and proceeded to reject 
the move to prove the existence of others, as it is impossible 
to phenom enologically constitute the other. Accordingly, 
Schutz proceeds from the “social world”, which is primordial, 
in order to explicate the phenom enological structures o f  
the social world. Now, Carr’s main criticism o f Schutz is that 
the latter always emphasizes the “understanding” relation, a 
relation in which there is no opacity or conflict, but only 
“co-operation”. This is certainly a valid criticism o f  Schutz’s 
p hen om enology o f  the social world. N evertheless, on e  
wonders whether it should be taken as a limitation o f  the 
phenomenological approach as such. One need not begin 
with such “und erstand ing” as the basis o f  society and  
consequently the problem o f “conflicts” can be taken up 
phenomenologically. If one keeps in mind the distinction 
b etw een  “so c ie ty ” and the “sc ien ce  o f  so c ie ty ”, the  
“understanding relation” may be viewed as a prelude to the
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science o f  society. It is o f  course true that Schutz has 
em phasized “verstehen” as an experiential form o f  reality 
rather than an epistemological or a methodological problem  
peculiar to the Social Sciences. Nevertheless, as Schutz points 
out, the experiential form o f reality as “...the common-sense 
knowledge o f  everyday life is the unquestioned but always 
questionable background within which inquiry starts and within 
which alone it can be carried out.” (emphasis added)5 Thus 
a p h en o m e n o lo g is t  n eed  n o t restrict h im se lf  to the  
“understanding” that facilitates only co-operation and no 
conflicts. He can always question that understanding if need  
be. In other words, if  H usserlian p h en om en o logy  is a 
“phenom enology of respect”, as Mohanty calls it, it need  
not be taken as rejecting conflicts. The phenom enology o f  
respect "... is methodologically committed to a respect for 
the given and to undertaking only such reflective analysis as 
is not repugnant to and is implied in the sense o f the given, 
or rather, in the given as a unity o f meaning. It does not 
judge but seeks to understand.”6 Thus, if conflicts are the 
real characterization  o f  our relation  with others, the 
phenom enology o f respect would be able to bring to the 
fore the sense o f such conflicts.
Carr’s main criticism of “the phenom enology o f respect” 
seems to be that in such an approach, “... the emphasis is on 
the sameness rather than the otherness o f the other.”7 On 
the other hand, according to Carr, only by recognizing “the 
o th er” as an “o th er”, as an antagonist, can we form  a 
community. He says, “...only with an other who is recognized 
as an antagonist can I form a gen u in e  com m unity by 
overcoming the antagonism in a common project. And this 
means surpassing the face-to-face relationship toward an 
action or experience whose proper subject is the we.”8 In 
such a “we relation” there is no subject—object dichotomy. 
My relation with the other is one o f participation and not 
that o f a subject to an object. But in Schutz, Carr points out 
that, the relation is very much a subject-object relationship 
in which “...the object happens to be another subject...”9
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According to Carr, this is the outcome o f the doctrine o f  
intentionality, a concept that has influenced thinkers like 
Schutz and Merleau-Ponty who, even while abandoning  
transcendental phenomenology in favour o f an existential 
phenomenology, still attempt to build the science o f society, 
in which the other has to be an “object”.
Now, we may point out that Carr’s worry is misplaced in 
the con tex t o f phen om enologica l philosophy o f social 
sciences. As a social scientific approach, it has to be definitely 
a science, and cannot remain contended with witnessing 
the ongoing flux o f social relations. It has to objectify its data, 
its phenomena, like any other science. But the advantage of  
a phenom enological approach precisely lies in that it does 
not reduce the “object” as a fact (Sachen) having its own 
reality, unconnected to the subject. The phenomenological 
perspective is to be distinguished from the objectivist’s 
attitude in the naturalistic stance— an attitude exemplified  
par excellence in Positivism. The objectivist seems to forget 
that transcendental subjectivity which reveals the meaning 
of the relationships in the life-world is not subjectivity within 
the world. Thus, a proper phenom enological perspective 
attests to the claim  that “...th e  life-w orld  d oes n ot 
co m p reh en d  what its ach iev em en t is and w hat th is 
achievem ent makes possible.... [T]he com prehension o f  
structures and the understanding of constitution is not just 
a simple knowing o f intentional acts or experiences that runs 
along with such acts, but is something that can be disclosed 
only through a post-eventum regressive reflective analysis and 
with the aid of most diverse clues.”10 What is important in 
the phenomenological approach is the “reflections” on the 
natural attitude and not what goes on in the natural attitude. 
In other words, the relationships in the life-world can be 
them atized  only at the level o f  reflection . Carr’s own 
prescription to recognize the “o th er” as an “o th er” by 
“surpassing the face-to-face relationship toward an action or 
experience whose proper subject is we”, seem to be deeply
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p h e n o m e n o lo g ica l and is in ag reem en t with the  
transcendental project o f phenom enology.11
In m aintaining that the doctrine o f  in tentionality  is 
designed to resolve the problems regarding the relation  
between hum an experience and nature, and therefore  
employing it to understand the social relations amounts to 
the misapplication o f the same, Carr seems to be holding a 
naive view o f social reality. If social relations are relations 
between persons, a "person” h im self or h erself is to be 
understood against the background o f  the world and nature. 
Social scientific explanations cannot be reduced to the ones 
that pertain to individual’s alone. As Husserl points out, 
“Nature” itself is, in phenom enology, brought under the 
intentional correlate o f the transcendental subjectivity. We 
may note here that “...transcendental consciousness and 
empirical consciousness are not two different domains, the 
latter an instance o f the former; but the two are the same. 
Transcendental consciousness is empirical consciousness, 
freed from its mundaneity, i.e., aware o f its own function as 
self-interpreting as well as meaning-giving, therefore as 
*Constituting both itself and its world.”12 Thus, one fails to 
understand why Carr thinks that only Nature and not persons 
can be brought under the scope of intentional relations.
Carr, however, is not alone in failing to grasp the relation 
between Nature and Society. Rather a long tradition o f  
sociology is guilty o f not integrating Nature and Society. As 
Murphy notes “... the theme o f the embeddedness o f social 
action in the process o f nature is still poorly integrated into 
mainstream sociology. The research on this theme has not 
yet influenced general sociological theory, which continues 
to proceed  as if  nature did not m atter.”13This has the 
negative co n seq u en ce o f  m anipulating N ature, which  
disturbs the delicate balance between man and Nature. Indra 
Munshi, an Indian sociologist, points out that one o f  the 
important tasks o f  sociologists is to take into account the 
dialectical relation between Nature and Society. This calls 
for a new understanding o f  social reality that does not treat
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social reality as an independent variable.14 Thus, we may 
argue that contrary to what Carr thinks of phenomenology, 
a proper phenom enological philosophy of social sciences 
can even address issues in the domain o f environmental 
philosophy and thereby enrich the concept o f “social reality” 
itself. There are phenom enologists who read the public 
relevance o f philosophy itself in terms of the potential o f 
phenom enology to understand the ecological crisis. Thus, 
drawing upon Arne Naess’ “Deep Ecology”, which claims 
that a new ecological understanding of the self naturally 
results in an ecological life-style, Melle notes that the crisis 
of our age consists in a crisis of purpose and values which 
can be overcome by phenomenological philosophy. He states 
that p h en o m en o lo g ica l approach being grou nd ed  in 
intuitive evidence and reasoning will not be calculative and 
constructive, nor quantifying and converting. It will rather 
be intuitive, m editative and herm eneutical. M oreover, 
phen om enology being subject-oriented and ceaselessly  
engaged in the process o f self-exam ination, will not be 
objecdvisdc.15
Carr’s co n ten tio n  in cr itic iz in g  the d octr in e  o f  
intentionality as ill-equipped to understand the social reality 
consists in his belief that it is only with a “we relation”, that 
is, o f the nature o f “participation”, that one can forge a 
genuine community with the other. In other words, for Carr, 
since the intentional relation is an objectification, “the other” 
as an “object” for the intending subject, it prevents genuine 
understanding o f “the other” as a person. Consequently, he 
claims that only an understanding which is conceived as an 
ontological process can do justice to “the other”. Such 
ontological understanding, one may argue, emanates from 
a primordial connection to the world and the other,-sgmd 
not the result o f  intellectual reflection. It is the process o f  
dialogue that is carried out within a concrete engagement 
with “the other”, a result o f “a fusion o f perspectives and 
h o r iz o n s”. W hat is s ig n ifica n t to the o n to lo g ica l  
understanding is the claim that an intendonal strategy cannot
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yield an authentic understanding o f  the other. However, 
Mohanty points out that such “...suspicion of method, and 
the idea that for a proper understanding, one should avoid 
an in ten tio n a lity  w hich  o b jectifie s  the o th er ...a re  
unnecessary. It is perhaps true that an ontological relation, 
in a sense that is difficult to formulate, connects one to the 
other and that such an ontological relation is a condition  
necessary for the possibility o f understanding.”16 However, 
M ohanty argues that ju st as o n e  n eed  n o t take 
methodological interpretation or intentional stance as the 
entire truth o f the “social relation”, one should not also 
construe the “non-intentional” ontological openness as 
characterizing the entire truth o f the matter. M ohanty 
elaborates this point by taking the example o f understanding 
a text. To understand the text, “...one must install oneself 
in a non-intentional, ontological relation to it, which may be 
regarded a la Gadamer as a mutual dialogue. But this does 
not suffice for an understanding of the text, it only prepares 
a ground. For a correct understanding, one must learn the 
language, one must be able to interpret the text through 
philological-historical research...”17 It is inevitable, then, that 
 ^one has to “objectify” to some extent what one wishes to 
understand. Such objectifications do not reduce “the other” 
completely to an object. There will definitely be some traces 
of subjectivity that cannot be objectified. Also, objectification 
is a two-way process in the context o f social reality. The other 
also objectifies me and about which I need not be worried 
so much. In fact, in a phenomenology of respect, a process 
o f such reciprocal understanding is carried out without 
“dehum anizing” the other.
O n e may n o te  h ere  that Carr’s su sp ic ion  o f  the  
p h en om enologica l project to understand social reality 
originates from his belief in the criticism o f the “philosophy 
o f  subject” and the related questioning o f  the reflexive 
philosophical method. Carr points out that som e thinkers 
criticize the phenomenological approach as they believe that 
it construes the relation between “Man and World” in terms
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o f an instrumental reason. But Carr goes a step further in 
raising the problem whether phenomenology can talk about 
any social relation at all. One of the motives to suspect the 
credibility o f transcendental philosophy comes from the fact 
that the “...presuppositions under which the legislative ego 
can appear ...[is] traversed by “the a priori o f a counter law,” 
by a condition o f “impossibility....”18 As Schurmann points 
out, the Heideggerian question of “being” is what leads to 
the suspicion o f a “...formal transgression at the very heart 
of transcendental legislation....”19According to Schurmann 
the nom othetical difference between transgression and 
leg isla tion  can be understood  in the fo llow ing three  
nom ontheses or positing of norms. The first nomothesis is 
that o f the “subject subjected”. By prescribing what to be, 
the leg is la tio n  im poses an order. Such ord erin g  is 
transcendental “...if the source oflaws is sought in the subject 
as bestowing the traits o f objectivity on nature and the traits 
o f  personality on itse lf.”20 Thus, Kant’s transcendental 
legislation attempts to order the experiences by way of  
positing norms. Now, in order to validate this transcendental 
legislation of norms, Kant has to answer to the question of 
“What is being?” Kant gives us two answers with respect to 
this question. The first, says Schurmann, is the “doctrinal” 
answer, as for Kant anything that is proved without a recourse 
to appearances, that is demonstrated a priori, is part o f a 
doctrine. Thus, Kant holds “being” as a category, one which 
synthesizes data into the unity o f objective experience. “As 
every other category, Dasein has objective validity only when 
it is gathered with the pure forms of intuition, time and 
space, and thereby constitutes whatever can becom e a 
phenom enon for us.”21 Kant also gives us another answer 
elsewhere. Schurmann calls it the “subversive” concept o f  
being, where being is taken as givenness itself. Kant says: 
“Being is not a predicate, nor a determination o f anything." 
It is not a predicate, as it does not add any thought-content 
to our conceptions. Thus, being as the positing o f anything 
follows from the givenness. So, for Kant, “...without givenness
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as its starting p o in t a ll k n ow led ge w ould  rem ain  
impossible.”22 Rant says: “That there is anything possible and 
yet nothing real is a contradiction since, if nothing existed, 
n o th in g  th ink ab le w ould  be g iv e n .”23 Thus, being as 
positedness follows from givenness o f ideal entities. In the 
critical philosophy o f Kant, this givenness is not to be taken 
as absolute givenness, but only as relative to our experience, 
as a relative positedness. Thus, the second notion o f being 
for Kant is that o f  “g iven n ess” itself. As a prim ordial 
“givenness”, it cannot be analyzed any further, but only be 
characterized negatively as “pre-cognitive”. Now, the question 
is, if “givenness” is the prerequisite for any knowledge, then 
how is the “I” given, the existing “I"? In his Critique o f Pure 
Reason, Kant says: “T he ‘I th in k ’ expresses the act o f  
determ ining my existence.”24 But, Schurmann points out 
that “my existence” cannot be a givenness to intellectual 
in tu itio n  or to form al co n sc io u sn ess  as it has to be 
determined by the “I think”. At the same time the “existing 
I” cannot be a “transcendental I”, nor can it be an “empirical 
I” as observed in our mental life, for such observations as 
self-experience require the inner observation to be conjoined  
to a pure concept o f understanding. But existence is not 
yet a category here, as Kant himself proclaims. Thus, “...the 
‘I think* is turned  in to  a p ro p o sitio n  o f  e x is ten c e  
, independently o f any recourse to categories.... [Kant] justifies 
that step by describing the existing I as ‘indeterminately 
given’, impossible to reify into a thinking thing.”25 That is, 
the “I” as the source o f all determinations, as the logical 
sub ject o f  all th in k in g  ca n n o t its e lf  be d eterm in ed  
categorically. This means that the “...subject thus shows itself 
to be broken. On the one hand, there is the determinative 
‘I think’ that posits itself and unfolds into twelve categories, 
on the other, ‘my ex is ten c e ’ which stands in n eed  o f  
determ ination .”26 Thus, here we see the transgression o f  
the legislation at its very core as “...the existing I shows that 
indeterm inacy and self-determ ination  are two equally  
ind ispensable m om ents o f  its b e in g .”27 This shows the
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displacem ent o f  the ‘‘philosophy o f  subject”, as its main 
propeller— the “reflective ego”, the “I think”—is incapable 
o f  positing the “existing I” as determinate. According to 
Schurmann, this announces the death o f modernity, for the 
interest in legislation is only a consequence of modernity 
which places all that is within the power o f the subject, the 
reflexive power o f the “I think”.
The second nomothesis of “(Anti-) subjectivism” can be 
seen in Nietzsche. In it the break between thinking and being 
is co m p lete . “F ollow ing the strategy o f  leg is la tio n —  
transgression, its new locus is that o f a break between thinking 
as making... and being as becoming,. ”2* It is (anti-)subjectivism 
inasmuch as he hypothesizes with and against the subject. 
In Nietzsche, the subject is a non-systematic, irreducible 
multiplicity and as a “polymorphous” subject it turns against 
any o n e  fic titio u s  th in k in g  I or on e tran scen d en ta l 
a p p ercep tio n . “N o lo n g er  d en o tin g  any su b ject as 
numerically one, the I ceases to be capable of instructing us 
about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of norms.”29 However, 
the legislation occurs as an act o f dom ination .within a 
configuration o f forces as a work of will. In it then legislation 
becomes an act o f saying “I”, it is a “will to power”. In his 
criticism o f moral values, Nietzsche shows the identity o f  
legislation and transgression in two complimentary ways: as 
a “...willful imposition o f laws by one nomothetical type, and... 
as the sh ap in g o f  power in to  force in a form ation  o f  
dom ination.”30 O f these, only the first, the willful imposition 
o f laws is o f  the subject. In the secon d , there is the 
displacement o f legislation from type to power and one may 
trace, says Schurmann, Ricoeur’s “transcendentalism without 
a subject” to this displacement. ‘T h e subject’s self-positing 
thus dissolves in the will to power which is no on e’s will, nor 
a type o f will. The counter-strategy revealed by the boundless 
drive for mastery over the earth marks the loss o f  the subject 
as referent.”31 It is so because there is the struggle o f  power 
for determination as legislation can happen only if power 
follows the strategy adopted for the constellation o f forces.
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Again, legislation takes place only if power constitutes an 
ind eterm inate m om ent in every form ation . T hus, for 
Nietzsche, it is this struggle o f power which is the locus o f  
any legislation and transgression. But with this shift from 
subject to power, transcendentalism has to abandon its field, 
namely consciousness.
The third nomothesis that Schurmann talks about is with 
reference to Heidegger, that o f the “subject de-centered”. 
From Kant, who was the spokesm an o f  m odernity , to 
Nietzsche, the harbinger o f late modernity, legislation finds 
itself taken away from the subject. But it is Heidegger who 
“...completes the move away from the subject. Phenomena 
are no longer in any way objects for the subject. It has ceased 
uttering the nomothetical “I” and claiming to position itself, 
be it ambiguously, at the centre o f the phenomenal field. It 
is de-centred.”32 Like Nietzsche, Heidegger emphasizes the 
indeterm inate factor in determ ination  as a process o f  
gathering phenom ena into certain constellations. In other 
words, what happens is not the unearthing o f a “structure”; 
the constellation is precisely the handiwork of “structuring”. 
In order to em phasize “structuring" over “stru cture”, 
H eidegger talks about “p resen cing .” In presencing, for 
^Heidegger, there is concealm ent along with unconceal­
ment. As Schuramann notes: “In H eidegger’s use, epechein 
(“to halt” or “stop”...) addresses both the self-reservation or 
concealm ent in presencing and its historical orderings or 
stampings....”’3 Thus, Heidegger shows that “legislation” is 
an attempt at displacing the “oneness” of thinking and being 
by representational thinking, thinking as “re-presenting”. 
As against legislation, Heidegger attempts to retrieve that 
identity o f thinking and being as one process, so that thinking 
merely manifests the modalities o f presence. This, Heidegger 
achieves through the conception o f being as time in such a 
way that the difference between a m ode o f beingness or 
presence and being or presencing constitutes the ontological 
difference or better, the temporal difference. Here what 
becomes originally legislative is the sudden epochs o f truth—
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“alethia”, the opening up of being as fundamental historical 
p osition s. It is these p osition s that justify any norm . 
Nevertheless, such an “...event o f  presencing, or ‘being’, 
differs from every given order of presence; each fundamental 
position is therefore already transgressed, permeated with 
indeterminacy, as it establishes itself, Thus Schurmann 
argues that in spite o f the material de-centring o f the subject, 
there is a formal continuity from Kant to Heidegger, through 
Nietzsche which he characterizes as the “nomothetical difference 
between legislation and transgression” ™ Now Schurmann claims 
that acknow-ledging this nom othetical difference has a 
significant m ethodological consequence for phenom eno­
logy, namely that it cannot remain content with descriptions. 
“Merely to describe the phenom enal network, the “life- 
w orld”, o f  an age is to miss the factor o f transgression  
operative in it. In more sociological terms the rationality of 
d escr ip tio n  am oun ts to ra tion aliz in g  ex istin g  social 
form ation s, leav ing  th eir  norm s and com m on sen se  
justifications u ntou ched .”16 This would leave the pheno­
menological descriptions without any scope for a critique, 
even th ou gh  such d escrip tion s w ould en ab le  on e to 
concretize the abstract concepts by tracing them back to 
the life-world. But what is missing in such a descriptive 
endeavour is precisely those norms and justifications that 
condition the life-world. However, this lack o f space for 
critique is rectified, Schurmann points out, in radical 
phenom enology that problematizes the legitimation and 
transgression of norms. As he says: “Situating what is said, 
both in scientific and in ordinary language, in relation to 
the nom othetical difference makes phenom enology into 
something it could never be as long as it remained a discourse 
about consciousness and its acts: a tool for discursive 
in terven tion .”37By “discursive intervention”, Schurmann 
means the critical act o f freeing the potential transgressions 
inscribed in the legislation by pointing out the displacements 
in the “topos” of our strategies that have led us to the site 
where we are.
142 > KOS3W THARAKAN
Is it possible to  adopt such a critical posture within the 
framework o f  transcendental philosophy? Mohanty seems 
to affirm such a possibility. Transcendental philosophy for 
him, is something that lays bare the ways in which subjectivity 
constitutes objectivity. In order to be so, the subject has to 
reflect on its own operations. By “reflection” he means such 
“...m ethodical turning back o f consciousness on itself... 
[and] has to be distinguished, on the one hand, from that 
pre-reflective translucency or reflexivity which characterises 
all our conscious life... and on the other hand, from what 
passes by the name o f  ‘introspection’ in older forms o f  
empirical psychology.”38 Again, transcendental reflection, 
as against empirical reflection, is not an object-directed  
cogn itive affair. Rather, it “...aim s at ex p lica tin g  the 
conditions o f the possibility o f any and every object-directed 
cognitive achievement which happens to be at hand.”39 This 
transcendental reflection can be either noetic or noematic, 
depending on whether the reflection is on the noetic acts 
or on th eir  n o em a tic  co n ten ts . In tran scen d en ta l 
phenomenology, reflection begins with noematic reflection 
and proceeds to noetic reflection. The noematic reflection 
can be either phenom enological or critical. “Phenom eno­
logical noematic reflection is interested in the ‘constitution’ 
o f noem ata in their correlative acts; a critical noem atic 
 ^ reflection is interested in laying bare the conditions under 
which a noem a acquires ‘validity’, becomes ‘true’— ‘truth’ 
and ‘falsity’ being possible predicates o f noemata....”40 Thus, 
we reiterate that transcendental p h en o m en o lo g y  can 
appropriate the critical stance within its fold and may lead 
to what Schurmann characterizes as discursive intervention.
With regard to the H eid eg g eria n  cr itiq u e o f  the  
metaphysics o f  presence that projects a “metaphysics o f  
absence”, Mohanty rightly observes that such a contrast is 
misleading. “If what is decisive is temporality with its integral 
horizon as contrasted with an exclusive concentration on 
the p resen t... one has to recall that the foundation o f such 
a conception o f temporality was laid first by Husserl within
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the framework o f a philosophy of consciousness... and there 
was no reason why a philosophy of consciousness as such could 
not absorb them into itself.”41 Thus, the principle o f “the 
interinvolvement o f disclosure and concealment”, that is the 
possibility o f laying bare as also within itself a concealment, 
m ust be capable o f  reso lv in g itse lf  in the am bit o f  
transcendental phenomenology. In such a transcendental 
philosophy, the concept o f consciousness is construed as the 
m ost in c lu sive , w herein  the d istin ction  betw een  the  
empirical and the transcendental itself tend to coalesce. 
A ccording to M ohanty, this is precisely the destiny o f  
transcendental philosophy.
Another possible way to look at critical praxis is through 
the prism o f axiology. It is the axiological dimension of praxis 
that Mays stresses when he com m ends Paci’s endeavour 
towards a phenom enological Marxism.42The phenom eno- 
logist’s concern with values is not to be understood merely 
as a “reflection” upon values. Rather, “...the discipline o f  
phenomenology, far from inhabiting solely the domain of 
strictly ep istem olog ical concerns, involves, no less, an 
axiological, and specifically an ethical vision... not merely a 
re flec tio n  u pon  ‘v a lu es’, con stru ed  as a narrowly 
circumscribed species o f intentional object, but that every 
intentional objectis, in its own way, a value...”** Laycock points 
out that som e values are “ideals”, such as transcendent 
in ten tio n a l ob jects and the W orld as the u ltim ately  
transcendent object as revealed by the phenom enological 
reduction is the locus o f absolute value. Thus, for him, the 
“...phenomenological reduction is...an ethically indispensable 
form o f praxis in which the otherwise concealed prereflective 
activity o f valuing, and in particular, intersubjective valuing, is 
revealed.”44 According to Laycock, a “value” is the object o f  
“valuing.” He points out that, for Husserl, the primordial 
instance o f  valuing is a prereflective and prethem atic  
“interest.” Interests are, so to say, a species o f valuing. Thus, 
for Husserl, intentional objects are “...values toward the 
realization o f which we may strive, and which, by degrees,
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we may ap p rox im ate , th ou gh  n ever e ffe c tin g  th eir  
exhaustive realization. Nothing, o f course, guarantees that 
our investigatory interest in a given transcendent object will 
be sustained. We can, at any moment, ‘lose interest’, thus 
turning away from this object toward another. Yet so long as 
the object remains o f interest to us, we strive to make it present 
through a potentially though never actually, infinite manifold 
of profiles.”45 In other words, the transcendent object that 
is intentional, orients our efforts so as to realize these efforts 
in some degree o f success. It is in this vein that Paul Ricoeur 
remarks that “every attention reveals an ‘I can’ at the heart 
of the ‘I think’”.46 In other words, we may say that “practice” 
is em b ed d ed  in “th o u g h t”. P recisely  th rou gh  such  
intertwining o f  consciousness and existence, a transcend­
ental phenom enology can capture the social reality in the 
endeavour o f consciousness.
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